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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Ann Frissell Lackey for the 
Master of Arts in History presented July 28, 1976. 
Title: Reapportionment: An Oregon History and a Critique 
of Baker vs Carr. 
APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
Thomas D. Morris, Chairman 
oron B. Dodds 
This study explores the ways in which federal and 
state authorities have sought to deal with a difficult 
problem of political power in the context of the U. S. 
Constitution. Oregon reapportionment history offers an 
appropriate introduction to a critique of the national 
reapportionment decisions of Baker vs Carr and Reynolds 
vs Sims. Its Constitution stipulated population and the 
2 
ratio derived from a population based formula were the 
means by which apportionment was to be determined and non-
compliance had been particularly evident from 1933 to 1952. 
Also, by the initiative process and a decision by the Oregon 
Supreme Court, Oregon had resolved its reapportionment prob-
lem before national action was taken, demonstrating that 
a state could resolve such problems without national 
intervention. 
The critique of Baker vs Carr is an attempt to examine 
the soundness of its judicial logic and thereby to demonstrate 
the impact it has had in perpetrating certain concepts 
of government. 
The data consulted included interviews with people 
directly involved in the events considered, Supreme Court 
decisions, secondary studies, state documents containing 
legislative minutes and exhibits. 
Oregon reapportionment history shows the ability of 
a state to solve a controversial political problem through 
the initiative process. However, the judicial logic in 
Baker vs Carr has created a new majoritarian philosophy of 
government that is unmindful of traditional concepts of 
federalism, and the Oregon experience. 
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C:iAFTE:it I 
Philosophically and historically, Ore~on reapporti)n-
ment provides a prelude well-suited to the study of t~e 
natior.al reapportion~ent cases, Ba~er vs Carr and Reynolds 
ys Sims. From its inception the Oregon Constitution 
contained provisions for reapportionment which, to a great 
extent, embodied the Majoritarian philosophy of these 
decisions. In Section 6 of the Constitution, it stated: 
The number of Senators and Representatives shall 
at the session next following an enumeration 
of the inhabitants by the United States, or this 
State, be fixed by law, and apportioned among 
the several cour.ties according to the number 
of white population in each. And the ratio of 
Senators and ~epresentatives shall be deterMined 
by dividing the whole n~~ber of white population 
of such county, or district by such respective 
ratios; and when a fraction shall result from 
such division, which shall exceed one half of 
said ratio, such county, or district shall be 
entitled to a member for such fraction; And in 
case any county shall not have the requisite 
population to entitle such county to a menber, 
then such county shall be attached to some ad-
joining C£unty for Senatorial or Representative 
purposes. 
1 Charles H. Carey, ed., The Ore~on Consti:ution, 
(Salem: State Printing Department, 1926), p~. lC7-4Cd. 
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Population and the ratio resulting from this base were to 
be the standards for apportioning state senators and state 
representatives, yet during the first half of the twentieth 
century Oregon had noticeably faltered in fulfilling its 
constitutional mandate. The consequence being that Oregon, 
like many other states, witnessed a dramatic struggle for 
legislative power between urban and rural areas as gross 
population inequities abounded. The seriousness of this 
confrontation was a source of nationwide concern. The 
magnitude of the controversy became increasingly felt during 
the late 1940's--a time when the nation, no longer in the 
shac~les of war, directed its attention to the urban 
metropolis teeming with people and to the growing burdens 
these numbers created for municipal government and its 
finances. So great were the problems for cities that the 
solution to the~ required political attention outside 
the realm of municipalities. For the cities' the 
reapport~onment movement, with its urban-oriented slogan 
'one-man, one-vote,' began as a search for much-needed 
solutions and soon became a vehement and meaningful expres-
sion of a quest for political identity. But Oregon, unli~e 
most states, distinguished itself. It aligned its 
reapportionment history with the original intent of the 
state constitution. The Oregon voters decided this conflict 
through the instrQ~er.tality of the initiative petition,2 
a notable accomplishment which predated 3aker vs Carr. 
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Oregon's initial apportionI'lent was February 14, 1859. 
The state's senators and representatives totalled 16 and 
34, respectively. A year later the maximum was set at 30 
and 60, but it wasn't until 1872 t~at these nu:r.lbers were 
reached. There were twenty-three reapportionments in 
Oregon between 1859 and 1961: eleven were general 
reapportionments effecting one or both legislative houses 
and twelve were minor ones made to allow legislative 
adjustments for newly created counties. Reapportionments 
for both legislative branches numbered nine. So perhaps 
the truest figure for judging the legislature's fulfillment 
of its constitutional mandate is this latter figure. Initially 
it appears to be a relatively healthy compliance with the 
population principle of reapportionment for every ten years 
in accordance with census figures; however, if just the 
nine reapportionments stretched over a period of approximately 
102 years are considered, the statistics are indeed decep-
tive. The variable closest to shedding light on the truth 
is the precise time the nine reapportionments were made. 
Before 1900 five of them were achieved, two of which were 
only two years apart, 1862 and 1864. After the turn 
2Gordon E. Baker, "Reapportionment by Initiative in 
Oregon," Western Political ;uarterly 2 (June 1960): 508. 
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of the century, four reacoorti·c~~ents were co~plP~e~ 
-- ... v •• ~\.;'~· 
But between the 1931-19J3readjustnents and the initiative 
sanctioned demand for reapportionl"'Jer:t in Novenber, 1952, 
there was a span of alnast twenty years. Before focusi~g 
upon some of the struggle caused by the effects of legis-
lative inaction, a cursory glance at various aspects of 
Oregon's geograpI'.y, economy, and demographic patterns is 
essential. 
Many of Oregon's western counties had been forrned 
by natural boundaries. The most easterly counties of 
western Oregon are bounded on the east by the prominent 
barrier, the Cascade Mountains, whereas counties on the 
extreme west are bounded by the Pacific Ocean. There are 
several remaining counties between these boundary counties 
of western Oregon. Together all these western counties 
cover an area of approximately one-third of the state's 
96,2093 square miles. The counties are Clatsop, Columbia, 
Tillamook, Washington, Mul tnoma...11, Clackamas, Yamhi 11, 
Marion, Lincoln, Polk, Benton, Linn, Douglas, Coos, Curry, 
Josephine, and Jackson. The remaining two-thir~s of Cregan 
roll from the Cascade Mountains easterly to the Idaho 3order. 
This spacious eastern expanse has substantially less rainfall, 
3coun tv and Ci tv :)a ta 3001-~, U. S. Departrlen~ of Cora."'":erce 
3ureau of t~e Census, 1967. 
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considerably higher percentage of land under irrieation, 
and proportionately much larger sized counties than its 
western counterpart. No large or navigable river, such 
as the Willamette in western Oregon, cut into this vast 
area. Only its northern or eastern-most counties could boast 
of the Columbia or Snake River as their boundary. Along 
the Columbia River are Hood River, Wasco, Sherman, Gilliam, 
and Morrow counties. Those counties along the Snake River 
are Wallowa, Baker, and Malheur counties. Aside from these 
two groups of eastern counties, there remain Jefferson, 
Deschutes, Klamath, Lake, Crook, Wheeler, Grant, Harney, 
Union, and Umatilla counties. 
Economically, the western counties are more diversified 
agriculturally and industrially than the eastern counties. 
The multiplicity of transportation routes and of transporta-
tion modes in western Oregon are contributive to important 
concentrations of industrialization. But the vastness and 
dryness of eastern Oregon is and was conducive to large 
farms, a fact long known in Oregon and one confirmed by 
1964 figures. They indicate approximately 1/2 of eastern 
Oregon contained farms of J,000 to 6,0004 acres, and a 
substantial portion of the remaining half area were in 
4A Preliminary Atlas of Ore~on, University of Oregon, 
Department of Geography, pp. 5-1, 5-2 (based on 1964 figures.) 
farms between 1,000 to 3,0005 acres. On the other hand 
western Oregon's farm size averaged between 100 to Soo6 
acres. Of this land in eastern Oregon most was used for 
hay, wheat, Irish potatoes, or cattle production along 
with significant contributions of fruit production from 
Hood River and Wasco counties. Looking at a map showing 
6 
irrigation statistics by counties one can see between 60 
to 100%7 of land under irrigation in eastern Oregon as con-
trasted by 0 to 8o%6under irrigation in western Oregon of 
which 20 to 40%9was the greatest amount. 
The history of Oregon's demographic patterns is 
interwoven with its geographic features and economic 
development. Population growth is important, since not 
only does it account for the creation of counties and the 
establishment of senatorial and representative districts, 
but it also introduces the problem of representation and 
population consistency. 
Before 1860 people flocked to the western region of 
the state, settling priMarily along coastal areas and 
5A Preliminary Atlas of Oregon, University of Oregon, 
Department of Geography, pp. 5-1, 5-2 (based on 1964 figures). 
6rbid. 
7Ibid. pp. 5-5, 5-6 (based on 1964 figures). 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid. 
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rivers such as the Willamette and Tualatin. As the 
nineteenth century c~~e to a close, western Oregon continued 
in its population increase. As Indian troubles subsided 
and ~nowledge of eastern Oregon's timber resources, gold 
discoverie~ grazing lands, and soil rich for grain crops 
became known, there was a tremendous spur of population 
growth in this region, too. But by 1930 the figures 
reflected steep population drops in this region, whereas 
western Oregon continued to show population expansion. 
In 1930 Multnomah County alone with its major city, Portland, 
had approximately 35% of the state's total. From this time 
to the 1960 1 s, the state's pattern of growth by numbers 
was in western Oregon predominately. There were many 
reasons for such a development. Among them were the attrac-
tions of commerce and industry afforded by the metropolitan 
areas a.long the Willamette River. Coastal regions increas-
ingly drew retirees to what soon became a retirement oasis 
and it also catered to vacationers by developing its re-
creation centers. Needless to say, the automobile made 
its indelible imprint on Oregon's population character. 
Western Oregon's advantage of more and better roads plus the 
opportunities awaiting people seeking work in centers of 
industry and lu.·11ber camps brought an influx of immigrants 
and migrants. Some of the newcomers filtered into orchard 
and farming regions of eastern Oregon; however, the majority 
settled west of the Cascades. The development of the sublll'bs 
from 1945 onward did muc~ to contribute new demographic 
features. Tl-lese becroom cor:·T:ur:i ties ;;ere an extension 
of the urban centers from 1,..;l':ich t::ey fanned. The 
distance was usually between 2 to 25 miles. Often 
they were in counties other than the county of the 
principal city about which they were clustered. This, 
therefore, frequently contributed to a significant rise 
in population of adjacent counties. In addition to these 
changes certain events created conditions that visibly 
10 
affected population patterns. For example, during 
the Great Depression millions of unemployed looked for 
much-needed jobs in the cities. 11 The Dust Bowl in the 
central plains States caused farmers and share croppers 
to desert their wind-parched farms and seek new 
opportunities, while the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
encouraged thousands to leave the south. 12 Later, both 
World War II and the Korean Conflict created millions of 
new jobs in urban centers. 13 These and other influences 
contributed to the imbalance between eastern and western 
lOGerald D. Nash, The American West in the Twe::tieth 
Century (New Jersey: Prentice-~all, Inc., 1973), in passi~. 
11Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Crises of Eie Old 
Order, 1919-1933 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), 
pp. 24t3-2:)1. 
12Arthur Schlesin~er, Jr., The Coming of the ~ew 
Deal (3oston: 2ou~hton Eifflin Company, 1959), P• 379. 
13~- ' i~asr:, ':'r.-:: A::-ierican Wes::, in the Ti.;entie~:-. Ce~:~~:r·:, 
in passim. 
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Oregon and for t~e snift of population from rural to urban 
centers. 
Population changes in the 1930 census did little 
to alter severe malapportiolli~ent. The legislature gave a 
slight nod of recognition to reapportionment in 1931 fer 
the house and in 1933 for the senate, but the changes were 
merely fractional in most instances, and in the reappor-
tiorunent of the house only two counties, Deschutes and 
Klamath, had substantial gains. Thorough reapportionment 
was lacking. Eultnomah County, which contained approx-
imately 35% of the state's population received no 
additional representation. 
Many reasons could be given to explain the legis-
lature's failure to act. One was certainly the city's, 
the state's, and the nation~ preoccupation with the ills 
of the Great Depression. Cities like New York, Chicago, 
and Portland were weighted down by the oppressions of the 
t . 14 1rie s. This preoccupation was soon followed by the 
concerns of World War II. Little effort was made to pursue 
serious and lasting remedies for the ever-increasing prob-
lems cities were experiencing as a result of their sharply 
rising populations. This was certainly true of Portland, 
for although sone people no~ed Ore0on 1 s failure to live up 
to its constitutional mandate, it was to be the late 
14schlesinger, The Crises of the Old Order, in oassim. 
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forties, the fifties, and the sixties that Oreson, along 
with the nation, was to feel the intense heat of the 
reapportionment controversy. 
In 1949 two bills purporting to ease or resolve the 
state's legislative malapportionrnent were introduced into 
the legislature. Statements drawn from one side or another 
and debates between opposing sides on the issue appeared 
continually in newspapers and journals. The tenor of these 
debates was very similar to the one between Senator Richard 
Neuberger of Multnomah County and Senator Philip Hitchcock 
of Klamath County, published in the :Kagazine Section of 
the Sunday Oregonian of October 30, 1949. Many of the 
thoughts expressed by each man are illustrative of the 
attitudes and philosophies that were to dominate Oregon 
and the nation throughout the next few decades. 
Senator Neuberger represented the populous urban 
interests and saw the solution to Oregon's problem in the 
adherence to the deMocratic majoritarian philosophy of 
government which demanded population as the criterion for 
deterr.iining representation, a philosophy adaptable to the 
reapportionment provision of the Oregon Constitution. 
The Senator was willing to concede that no county should 
have more than JO% of the state's representation. T~ere were 
reasons underlying his compromise; especially the importance o~ 
gaining support from other counties was essential for securin~ 
sone equitable re pre sen ta tio:-i for Eul tnomah County. Li,rn:-::. se, 
11 
strong fears prevailed tnat a true observance of the 
constitutional mandate as interpreted by the urban group 
would create an imbalance in the legislature with Multnomah 
County's large numbers dominating it. To allay these 
fears, gross inequities in other counties, such as Klamath 
and Lane Counties, were quickly pointed out. But Senator 
Hitchcock drew other inferences from the situation. It 
was not a question of majoritarian rule; rather it was 
the reliance upon the philosophy of republican government 
with the system of checks and balances designed to protect 
minority interests and rights. Believing the nation's 
government to have been based on majoritarian rule was 
"inaccurate."15 The Senator further envisioned the 
fulfillment of the constitutional mandate with Senator 
Neuberger's interpretation as a step toward triumvirate 
rule in the legislature by "three industrial counties of 
the state of Oregon."16 Representing the less populous, 
agrarian-oriented counties, Senator Hitchcock also noted that 
it was true during the adoption of the Oregon Constitution 
that substantial population inequities existed. Still the 
state as a whole had most of the same interests. Oregon 
had been primarily an agriculturally based economy. Now the 
fears grew out of the obvious differences of interests in 
l5 11 Should the Oregon Legislature be Reapportioned?" 
Oregonian, October 30, 19l9, Magazine Section, p. 9. 
16Ibid. 
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the state due to industrialization, or as the Senator su~gested 
in comparing 1859 and 1949: "There was no segregation of 
the population into classes with widely diverse interests 
as there is today. 1117 Would the interests of a metropolitan 
or suburban community be injurious to the interests of the 
less populous rural community? If so, how would its voice 
be heard above the overwhelming cries of the urban complex?18 
To Senator Neuberger and his followers the problem 
was clearly a question of rotten boroughs, or grossly under-
represented majorities. To Senator Hitchcock and his 
followers the problem was protecting minority rights and 
interests in the event of a possible avalanche of majority 
control by those of completely diverse backgrounds and in-
terests. The activities, attitudes, and philosophies of 
each individual or group were greatly determined by its 
sympathy for one side or the other. In the most extreme 
forms each side believed in strict conformity to its 
criterion in the determination of representation, for 
the urbanites it was population and for the ruralists it 
was area or interests tied to territory. 
l7"Should the Oregon Legislature be reapportioned?" 
Oregonian, October 30, 1949, Magazine Section, p. 9. 
l~ 
c;"Reapportionrnent, 11 The Oregon Voter, 35 (October 8, 
1949); 3-8. 
13 
Those who hailed the population standard had several 
advantages giving support to their cause. Gross inequities 
were a fact and were the result of population change. The 
Oregon Constitution had stipulated population and the 
resultant ratio to be the basis for representation. A sad 
discrepancy between Oregon constitutional law and its 
enforcement prevailed. Also, the use of population as a 
criterion was advantageous because it was statistically 
measurable and, therefore, a relatively reliable index. 
Moreover, the large metropolitan areas of the nation were 
thrusting upon the country a forceful political identity 
and an awakening of power to be reckoned with. The force 
against which the battle was to be waged was equally 
formidable. Those who hailed the area standard had the 
advantage of a malapportioned legislature capable of 
stiffling legislative reapportionment action. Rural interests 
had a century of dominance in the l.egislature and the 
identity of rural America was embedded in the history of 
the state and the nation. Also, area was an unchangeable, 
measurable standard, and in Oregon 2/3's of the area was 
east of the Cascades in the large agricultural regions. 
This boast could counteract the population standard which 
threatened to deprive this eastern region of much of its 
representation and, consequently, its power in the legislature. 
Moreover, the insistence upon the philosophy of republican 
14 
government with checKs and balances designed to protect 
minority rights was neither vacant nor obsolete. The 
problem remained. How was representation to be 
interpreted? As t~e reapportionnent controversy loomed 
high on the horizon of Oregon politics, a solution was 
found. However, during the follo~ing decades reiterations 
and accentuations of these two poles of conviction arose 
interspersed with numerous modifications. 
In view of the sharp rise of public sentiment and 
the onrush of political debate, it was no surprise to 
see a reapportionment measure on the November 7, 1950 
ballot. Enough signatures had been procured for the 
initiative petition. Some of its most notable items proposed 
as an amendment to the constitution were increasing the 
number of senators to thirty-six, allowing at least one 
representative for each county, requiring a ceiling of 
one-fourth the legislature's seats to any one county, 
and enlarging reapportionment enforcement to the Secretary 
of State should the legislature fail in its duty or giving 
the Supreme Court jurisdiction should both fail. It was 
a compromise designed to provide some protection for 
ruralists and to offer some equity for urbanites. But 
those who would have the most to lose made the greatest 
protest. They were labor and other metropolitan interest 
15 
groups who opposed the proposal and urged voters to 
"preserve our right to equal representation. 1119 The 
election returns showed 190,99220 yes votes and 215,30221 
no votes. The initiative of 1950 was defeated by approx-
imately 24,310 votes. Perhaps the most significant role 
played by the 1950 measure was its inestimable value as 
a testing ground for 1952. What was lac~dng in 1950 was 
very much apparent in 1952. Political reality had made 
itself felt amongst politically oriented groups and 
individuals. Doubtless, the reasonable recourse was to 
reassess views. The jockeying for new leadership within 
the Young Republicans was an example. Leading the College League 
of the Young Republicans in strongly dissenting from the 
views held by the major forces of the Young Republicans, 
Clay Myer~ repeated efforts for acceptance and ascendancy 
were rewarded by his capturing the chairmanship of the 
Young Republicans and, with the assistance of his group, 
redirecting the Young Republicans' attitudes on reappor-
tionment.22 Likewise, influence was felt in the Young 
19
state of Oregon, Oregon Voter's Pamphlet, November 7, 
1950 (Salem, Secretary of State's Office, 19SO), p. 34. 
20
state of Oregon, Oregon Bluebook, 1963-1964 (Salem, 
Secretary of State's Office, 1963), p. 203. 
21Ibid. 
22
rnterview with Clay Y.yers, Oregon Secretary of State, 
Salem, Oregon, January 2, 1976. 
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Democrats with Walter Dodd, a University of Oregon 
professor of political science and a knowledgable researcher 
on Oregon reapportionment, persuasively making his expertise 
and credo known. The Non-Partisan Committee for Constitutional 
Reapportionment came into being as a result of the con-
certed efforts of the League of Women Voters, the Young 
Republicans and the Young Democrats. To gain the League 
of Women Voters' support, the Young Republicans approached 
the Young Democrats to form the Non-Partisan Committee for 
Constitutional Reapportionment with bi-partisan represent-
ation. 23 Effective backing was also contributed by organized 
labor and other urban allied groups. Added to this political 
strength was newspaper support24 from the Oregonian, the 
Oregon Journal, and the Oregon Statesman as well as "two 
of eastern Oregon's most important dailies, the Bend 
Bulletin and the Pendleton East Oregonian." 25 
On November 2, 1952,an initiative petition amending 
the constitution and affirming its basic content of an 
apportionment based on population and the population ratio 
was presented to the electorate. Features of the initiative 
petition that might be considered attractive to the people 
23rnterview with Clay Myers, Oregon Secretary of 
State, Salem, Oregon, .May 24, 1976. 
24Baker, "Reapportionment by Initiative in Oregon," 
p. 512. 
25Ibid. 
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were that it contained the spirit of the original con-
stitutional provision providing population and its ratio 
formula as the basis of representation; it incorporated 
the 1950 section which enlarged reapportionment jurisdiction 
by guaranteeing proper enforcement through the ultimate 
review of the Supreme Court if necessary; it left the 
maximum senate seats at thirty avoiding further tax burdens 
that the 1950 specifications of an additional six members 
might have caused. But probably the most significant 
factor assisting the measure was the belief that adherence 
to the Oregon Constitution meant compromise for both area 
and population philosophies of government. 26 This was the 
reason for the League's sudden change from its adamant 
stand against literal interpretation of the constitution. 
It was also a belief held by the Young Republicans, and Clay 
Myers, and it was publically applauded by the press. 27 
The 'major fraction' section of the constitution was the 
key. According to the rules of 'major fraction,' "once a 
county or district has obtained more than half a ratio it 
is ipso facto entitled to a member before another county 
or district having more than 1 1/2 ratios is entitled to 
additional representation. 28 
260 . regon1an, April 28, 1952. 
27 Ibid. 
28League of Women Voters, "Reapportionment," 
(Portland, OR.: November, 1951), p. 5. 
With the asswnption that the total population for 
Oregon was about l,50C,OOO, the League of Women Voters 
believed: 
If it takes approximately 50,000 people (the 
ratio) to elect a senator, any county that 
has 25,00l people is entitled to one senator 
because it has at least one person over 
one-half the number required by the "ratio" 
needed for one senator. Each district with a 
major fraction of a "ratio" (25,00l), or a full 
ratio (50,000) is assigned a senator. Then 
those districts with one full ratio plus a major 
fraction (75,00l) or two full ratios (100,000) 
receive a second senator. This is continued 
until the thirty senators are assigned. It is 
apparent from this procedure th~t the heavily 
populated counties (Multnomah) may be left with 
a major fraction of or a full ration or more for 
which they receive no legislator. The following 
examples are for senatorial representation: 
Benton Co. with pop. of 31,500 which is major 
fraction of 50,000 receives one senator. 
Clackamas Co. with pop. of 86,600 (50,000 plus 
36,000) gets two senators. 
Lane Co. with pop. of 125,000 has 2 full ratios 
but less than the major fraction needed for third 
senator so gets two senators. 
Mult. Co. with pop. of 468,ooo has 9 full ratios 
but there are not enough senators to fill it out 
so they get 7 senators. 
Under this system, established in our state 
constitution, the smaller counties are given full 
representation first. The lM'ger counties receive 
what is left. This is not area and interest, nor 
straight population representation, but it 
represents a compromise between the two theories. 29 
16 
Xany seemed to have thought this was t:1e intent of the 1952 
initiative petition. In fact, Shirley A. Field who was then 
a practicing attorney and one of the drafters of the 
amendment unequivocally stated the 'major fraction' rule as 
29League of WoMen Voters, "Reapportionment," (Portland, 
Or.: November, 1951), p. 5. 
19 
conceived by Clay :·:ye rs was the intent of its fran1ers. 
Such interpretations certainly softened the prospect of 
any adherence to the 'pure' population principle and 
were contributive to wielding impressive voter power. 
All these desirable factors were instrumental in 
securing passage of the measure. It was adopted by an 
overwhelming majority of approximately 163,258 votes 
30 . 31 (194,292 no votes and 357,550 yes votes). If the 
passage of the 1952 constitutional amendment was looked 
upon by observers as a political truce or the end of the 
reapportionment controversy, they were very mistaken. 
While many legislators were concentrating on refinements 
of reapportionment in matters such as subdistricting 
or election by position number, others were either 
still attempting to persuade the legislature, the courts, 
and the electorate to adopt either a federal plan insuring 
each county a senator or representative or pushing for 
some newly conceived 'balanced plan' more favorable to 
ruralists than the 1952 measure. 
In 1953 Representative David Baum of La Grande, whose 
constituency would be effected by observance of t~e new 
constitutional mandate, filed suit against the 1952 
30 6 Oregon 3luebook, 19 3-1964, p. 203. 
3libid. 
20 
amendment "as~:ing :'or a declaratory judgment that the 
amendMent was invalid."32 His principal argument was that 
the extension of jurisdiction to the Oreeon Supreme Court 
was a violation of the separation of powers. Baum took 
the position that reapportionment was solely a legislative 
function. The circuit court decided for the amendment and 
upon appeal the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the lower court's 
judgment. 
Understandably eastern Oregon felt the loss of power 
in the legislature. The predominance of urban interests 
to the detriment of rural interests continued to be their 
main concern. Past arguments both forceful and wea~ 
continued to be reiterated in the ruralist's defense. 
Basic to some of them was the strong belief in the 'solid 
virtues' of the farmer. Because of "his honest industry, 
his independence, his frank s"'.:lirit of equality, 11 33 
and "his ability to produce and enjoy a simple abundance,"34 
the farmer was admired and extolled as the ideal man. 
During the 18th century the subject or hero was the yeoman 
farmer. But commercialization, industrialization, and 
urbanization progressively destroyed the facts upon which 
32Legislative Committee on Reapportionment, 
Rea;portiorunent Do-it-Yourself Kit (Salem: State 
/19 ];/), p. 10. 
Le~islati ve 
Printing, 
33Richard Hofstader, The Age of Reform, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1955), p. 23. 
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this belief was built and as this diminished it gave way 
to greater fancy and fiction. Without discrimination this 
pervasive belief, which historian Richard Hofstader had 
so aptly terned "the agrarian myth, 11 35 was increasingly 
used to include most all aspects of rural life and those 
who participated in it. In 1926 the tone of the argument 
in Oregon was simple and direct. It stated: 
On the average, the outside counties elect 
members whose mental and moral stature is 
superior--on the average, we repeat--to 
those elected by the Portland vote. Often 
the large city needs protection against the 
purposes and
3
golicies of its own elected 
legislators. 
By 1954 a more sophisticated approach was accepted, yet 
the undercurrent of the agrarian myth was nonetheless 
present. In the Oregon Voter Ralph T. Moore wrote: 
There is no intent herein to indict urban 
voters as such. They are fully as intelligent 
and competent as rural voters. But they are 
insulated from issues and candidates to a far 
greater degree by circumstances that cannot be 
voided. It follows that they miss the mark 
in appraisal more often than do rural voters 
and through no fault of their own.Jr 
The Vale Enterorise agreed: 
35Richard Hofstader, The Age of Reform, (New York: 
Vinta~e 3ooks, 1955), p. 23. 
3611 1 . 1 t. A t. -1- II 0 egis a ive ppor ionmenv, regon Voter 46 
(September 25, 1926), 4. 
37Ibid. Earch 20, 1954, p. 18. 
Ask any representative at Salem who it is that 
has the greatest freedo~ of personal judgment, the 
representatives of rural areas or those from 
highly populated areas? He will tell you without 
much hesitation that the political pressure from 
pressure groups exerted for Multnomah County 
lawmakers, for instance, would quickly lead to 
much capricious, irresponsible legislation were it 
not for the stabil~ty given the assembly by its 
rural contingent.3b 
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Dissatisfaction with Oregon's amended reapportionment 
provision reached new heights after the September, 1961, 
Oregon Supreme Court decision of In re Legislative 
Apportionment. In the 1961 legislative session, the house 
and senate passed House Bill 1665 which was a reiteration 
of the intent Clay Myers, Shirley Field, the League of Women 
Voters and others had had in drafting and sponsoring the 
1952 constitutional amendment. H. B. 1665 supported the 
assumption that all counties registering a major fraction 
ratio were entitled to their representation before counties 
with ratios allowing them two or more legislators were 
given their additional representation. H. B. 1665 became 
Chapter 482 of the Oregon Laws, 1961. The problem was 
that only 30 senate seats and 60 house seats could be alloted 
among the thirty-six Oregon counties. If major fractions 
were thus treated, then counties with substantial ratios 
like Lane, Jackson, or Multnomah Counties would be given 
whatever was remaining. In the 1961 apportionment, 
3811 Legislative Apportionment," Oregon Voter 46 
(July 30, 1955, p. 4). 
Multnomah County was deprived of two whole ratios, one 
for the house and one for the senate. Lane and Jackson 
Counties had no representation for the:r major fraction 
ratios. 
Attempting to redress this inequit~ Vern Cook, a 
newly e lee ted Multnomah County legislator, too~~ action. 
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As attorney for petitioners--Charles McKinley; Howard Dean, 
a political science professor at Portland State College; 
and Donald Balmer, a political science professor at Lewis 
and Clark College--he sought judicial remedy. He petitioned 
for review and in his brief was joined by Dirk Snel and 
Reuben Lens~e. The latter also presented a brief amicus curiae 
pro se, that is a brief presented by a person having no 
right to appear in court but who is allowed in a suit to 
introduce argument, evidence, or authority to protect his 
interests. Another petitioner was Eleanor Kafour~ represented 
by William McLennan. Edward Fadeley, state representative 
from Eugene, submitted his own brief. The Attorney 
General, Robert Thornton, and his assistant, Louis Bonney, 
likewise offered opposition to the legislation in their 
brief of amicus curiae. Those who regarded Chapter 482 as 
constitutional and as equi~able as possible were Portlanders 
Clay Myers, Robert Jones, Ken Kaher, and Victor Atiyeh. 
From Hood River and Eugene were George Annala and F. F. 
Montgomery, respectively. T:1ese men had attorneys Edwin 
Peterson of Portland and Douglas Spencer of Eugene ~~~uing 
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their cause in a brief amicus curiae. Justice J. O'Connell 
delivered the court's opinion. He temporarily disregarded 
Multnomah County's ~ajor fraction and took issue with 
the legislature's failure to apportion an additional 
representative to the 12th senatorial district. 
The plan had given 7 senators to a county having a 
ratio of 8.868. O'Connell objected saying: 
••• it is impossible for us to conceive of 
a reasonable interpretation of Article IV, 
6 which would permit the legislative assembly 
to subtract a whole number from the quotient 
resulting from the application of the 
constitutional formula for determin~ijg 
representation in the state senate. 
The ratio was arrived at by simple division of the state's 
total population by 30 senate seats or 60 house seats, 
depending upon which branch was being considered. At 
this time Multnomah County's population was high enough to 
register a senatorial district ratio of 8.868 meaning 
8 was the whole number ratio entitling the county to 8 
senators and .868 was the remaining major fraction. For 
the house seats Multnomah County had 17.736, 17 being t~e 
whole number ratio for which the County could expect 
representative seats and .736 was the major fraction. The 
apportionment plan being contested had favored some counties 
with major fractions and neglected to allot the legislative 
seats to two of Multnomah County's whole number ratios. 
The Justice emphatically stated "representation is based 
39rn re Le~islative Apportionment, 228 Oregon 570. 
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on population ratio"40 and t!le "constitution makes no 
mention of the use of any other factor in making apportion-
ment. 41 Upon this premise the legislature has no authority 
to modify apportionment so as to ignore the results of this 
arithmetic process; whole number ratios cannot be disregarded. 
Once apportionment for whole numbers was achieved then 
latitude was dee~ed permissable with the legislature's 
"power to adjust the major f~actions 1142 for the remaining 
seats. Words of caution were given by Justice O'Connell 
when he admitted the legislature's power to combine 
districts or to determine which major fraction county should 
be given representation. These actions were to be considered 
adjustments to "the constitutional formula so that it can 
be made to work."43 In other words all adjustments were 
to be subordinate to and in conjunction with this ruling. 
This was the first incident of Supreme Court action 
based on enlarged jurisdictional powers granted it by the 
1952 amendment which guaranteed enforcement of the constitu-
tional provision. The novelty of the action incensed many 
rural legislators and rural-oriented groups and individuals. 
4°rn re Le~islative Apportionment, 228 Oregon 570. 
4libid. 
42~., p. 571. 
43~., p. 573. 
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In response to the decision they were successful in 
drafting and placing on the November, 1961 ballot a 
reapportionment initiative. Of the sixty-five representa-
tive seats asked for, thirty were to be permanent with the 
remaining thirty-five to be apportioned among counties on 
the basis of population. Senate seats were to be increased 
to thirty-five. The measure faile~ with 325,182 no44 
votes and 197,322 yes45 votes being cast. The margin was 
an overwhelming 127,860 votes. This was Oregon's final 
answer as to its position on state legislative reappor-
tionment and within the same month Oregon's stance was to 
be reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court. 
44oregon Bluebook, 1963-1964, p. 202. 
45Ibid. 
CHAPTER II 
BAKER VS CARR 
During the Warren Court's tenure, many decisions 
of import were rendered under the aegis of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection.Clause. Among them were 
such decisions as the civil rights of black people and 
the quality of the criminal justice system. Whatever 
a person's social, economic, or political views, it is 
clear that the court's achievements in the realm of civil 
liberties cannot be dismissed. But paradoxically enough, 
by its interpretation and application of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause as a basis for the protection of individual 
voting rights, the court bestowed upon the nation its 
assent to a democratic majoritarian philosophy. Subject 
to the most enthusiastic accolades and to the severest 
criticism, Baker vs Carr (1962) was the Warren Court's 
first and most crucial attempt to deal with malapportionment 
which had become a much publicized problen in the nation 
from the late forties through the fifties and sixties. 
This great landmark decision of the Supreme Court began 
the series of reapportionment cases reflecting a majori-
tarian philosophy, paved the way for the attractive 
nationally coined-phrase 'one man-one vote', and gave 
credence to the belief that each person was entitled to 
the s~~e weight his vote would carry as compared to his 
counterpart's in other constituencies. Besides the 
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Supreme Court's initial acceptance of the malapportionment 
problem, the decision found the court, in effect, designating 
itself as the responsible body to whom the resolution of 
the problem should be addressed. This posture coupled 
with the majoritarian philosophy which most of the Warren 
Court seemed to have espoused was the kindling that lit 
the fire of controversy among court commentators. Much 
of the content in the justices' opinions in Baker was 
devoted either to the defense of or the rebuttal of these 
two points. So paramount was the concern over the judiciary's 
role that little was said or observed about the precise 
way the court embraced the responsibility. This serious 
neglect warrants a re-examination of Baker vs Carr. 
Baker vs Carr originated in a suit brought by Charles 
Baker against Termesse 1 s Secretary of State Joe Carr. 
These men were natives of Termesse who had moved from the 
country to the city and played active roles in state 
politics. Charles Baker had become the Mayor of Millington 
and a Millington representative on the Shelby County 
Quarterly Court in 1950. Millington was a town almost 
grown into a suburb as a result of the tremendous growth 
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created by its naval base during World War II. Such 
growth had drawn Millington and Memphis together maidng 
whatever distance there was in miles seem insignificant. 
The Shelby County Quarterly Court to which Millington 
sent a representative was "a fiscal, legislative body 
that ran the affairs of a rapidly urbanizing metropolitan 
area where more than 600,000 people then lived."46 By 
1954 Baker had been elected chairman of the committee. 
Memphis and Charles Baker were to feel the impact of increas-
ingly complex and pressing urban problems which required 
appreciably greater finances. However, the inequity of 
the state's revenue distribut~on, because of a severly 
malapportioned legislature, had left metropolitan govern-
ments like Memphis' in straits. Having been prompted by 
the desire to alleviate this situation, Charles Baker filed 
suit against the 1901 Tennesse reapportionment statute 
or more specifically against Joe Carr, the Secretary of 
State. Like so many of its sister states, Tennesse had 
experienced a great shift in population from rural areas 
to large metropolitan centers like Nashville, Memphis, 
Knoxville, and Chattanooga. Yet, political power had not 
fol1:wed this shift. It had been retained by the more 
sparsely populated, agricultural regions of the state 
46Gene Graham, One Xan One Vote (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Corr.pany 1972), p. 17. 
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leaving urban areas grossly underrepresented in the state 
General Assembly. Charles Baker's co~plaint alleged that 
the 1901 statute denied him and other persons residing in 
similar type locale the Fourteenth Amendment's equal pro-· 
tection of the laws "by virtue of the debasement of their 
votes."47 The suit was dismissed by the federal district 
court on the grounds that "it lac~ed jurisdiction of subject 
matter and no claim was stated upon which relief could be 
granted."48 The case was then appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. Baker vs Carr was heard by the 
Supreme Court and was decided March 26, 1962. Writing 
the majority opinion for the court was Justice William 
Brennan whose order of issues for condideration fell into 
three categories: jurisdiction, standing, and justiciability. 
A format clearly designed to answer the federal district 
court's dismissal order in the manner in which the lower 
court had answered the complaint. 
To arrive at a greater perception and perspective of 
Baker, it is best to follow the sequential patterns laid 
down by the court and to include other Supreme Court 
decisions. Among them are Brown vs The Board of Education 
and Reynolds vs Sims, handed down by the ilarren Court in 
1954 and 1964 respectively. Also there are Mahan vs Pric~ard, 
47Baker vs Carr, 82 S.Ct. 694. 
48Ibid. 
a product of the Burger Court in February of 1973, and 
Luther vs Borden, the result of the Taney Court's 
deliberations in 1849. 
The three categories in 3aker are distinguishable 
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by definitions commonly found in standard or legal diction-
aries. The court's power or authority to review a case, 
which in effect means to interpret and apply the law, is 
jurisdiction. The position from which legal rights and 
duties may be asserted or enforced is standing. Finally, 
the determination of whether it is proper or appropriate 
for the court to hear a case is justiciability. 
CHAPTER III 
JURISDICTION 
In addressing itself to the problem of jurisdiction, 
the court in the majority opinion of Balrnr declared: 
It is clear that the cause of action is 
one which ''arises under" the Federal 
Constitution. The complaint alleges that 
the 1901 statute effects an apportionment 
that deprives the appellants of the equal 
protection of the laws in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment ••• 49 
We hold that the District Court has 
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the 
federal constitutional claim asserted in 
the complaint • .50 
With the admission of federal jurisdiction as sought by 
the appellants in Baker under the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a political 
right to which all individual voters were entitled. The 
court assented to the proposition that the political 
right to be protected was equal voting weight; a doctrine 
more clearly enunciated in later decisions. 
Implicit in the court's acceptance of jurisdiction 
over state legislative reapportionment as written by Justice 
Brennan in the majority opinion is the admission of the 
u9Baker vs Carr, 82 S.Ct. 700. 
50ibid., p. 703. 
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premise that just as every man is equal before the law 
in t~e judicial system, so too every man is equal before 
his government. The equal relationship enjoyed by the 
litigant and the voter to their several bodies necessarily 
infers a 'one to one' relationship. Such a basis furnishes 
the logic for granting to every voter the individual 
political right to an equal weight of his vote in the 
electoral process. 
The suggestion of a parallel to be drawn between 
Baker vs Carr and previous Warren Court decisions under the 
Equal Protection Clause further punctuates Justice Brennan's 
theorem. Brown vs The Board of Education and Baker vs Carr 
have drawn frequent comments in this regard, probably 
because both cases were and are landmark decisions deeply 
effecting social history and political history. To both 
cases the court applied the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment extending individual rights. Also, 
Baker was the assertion of a political right under a civil 
rights amendment whereas its predecessor, Brown, was the 
declaration of a civil right under an amendment of the same 
purport. It is these qualities that lend themselves to 
the consideration of the SupreMe Court's parallel usage of 
this very familiar legal standard, one which even Justice 
Fran.Kfurter alluded to in his dissent: 
Appellants appear as representatives of a class 
that is prejudiced as a class, in contradistinction 
to the polity in its entirety. However, the 
discrimination relied on is the deprivation of 
what appellants conceive to be their propor-
tionate share of political influence. This, 
of course, is the practical effect of any 
allocation of power with the institutions 
of government • .'::>l 
Frankfurter's remarks were two fold. They served as an 
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admonishment and a disclosure of what the Justice felt was 
the court's subsequent abuse of its application of the 
Equal Protection Clause. The coincidence, thereby, offered 
an open door for the Supreme Court's advancement of a 
majoritarian philosophy of government. But the question 
now presents itself; was there substantial cause for Justice 
Frankfurter's objection? The key lies somewhere between 
the parallel usage of the Clause and the premises upon 
which it was applied. 
In Brown vs the Board of Education the court 
broadened the base of the Equal Protection Clause by 
establishing the civil right of equal educational opportunity 
(the subject to be protected was the Negro, more generally 
racial minorities, and the object to be achieved was equal 
educational opportunity through school desegregation). In 
Baker vs Carr the political right of the individual voter 
to 'equal' voting weight at the polls was acxnowledged by 
the court under the Equal Protection Clause (the subject 
here to be protected was the individual voter and the 
5lBaker vs Carr, 82 S.Ct. p. 754. 
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object to be achieved was "fair and effective"52 
representation through equalized voting weight). A brief 
glance indicates obvious similarities. Both were exten-
sions of constitutional rights under the same clause. But 
the essence of the parallel does not cc.me from the 
expansion of the equal protection principle or rule; 
rather it comes from the subject to which the principle is 
applied and the object it endeavors to accomplish. 
Racial status has its beginning and end in the single 
and uncontrollable factor of birth. That it reaches group 
dimensions is attributable only to others' possession of 
it, and the degree of solidarity within the group varies 
and is dependant on the pressures directed for or against 
this sole factor. Therefore, the people of the group 
represent a "class"53of individuals. In a statement made 
by the American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon in testimony 
before the Oregon House Elections Committee, April 1965 the 
court's reasoning was aptly stated: 
The American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon 
endorses the principle that all men are equal 
before the law and are, therefore, entitled to 
equal votes and to equal representation in state 
legislative assemblies. This principle of equality 
of representation is embodied in the equal protec-
tion of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
52Reynolds VS Sims 84 s.ct. 1383. 
53BaE.er vs Carr 82 S.Ct. 754. 
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to the United States Constitution.54 
The result of the court's premise relying on its analogous 
reasoning and application in Brown and Baker has been to 
create what the ACLU's remarks suggest; equality before the 
law and equality of voting weight in participating within 
the republican structure of govern.~ent are synonymous in 
nature. 
To achieve equality people must be conceived as num-
bers in a population figure; regard for historic, geographic, 
economic, political, religious, and other special interests 
is necessarily illogical. Considerations such as these 
create inequalities because they are highly variable factors, 
a reality well demonstrated in politics. Ironically, 
those who praise the Warren Court for Baker vs Carr and 
Reynolds vs Sims are sometimes the same individuals 
lamenting the Supreme Court's failure to solve the gerrymander 
problem. A foremost example is Gordon Baker, an out-spoken 
critic of state reapportionment during pre-Baker times. 
In an essay devoted to the gerrymander, Mr. Baker commended 
the court for past reapportionment actions and proceeded 
to mention: 
The most troublesorre question, however, not 
only remained unsettled, but loomed even larger 
in significance. The gerrymander--the intentional 
manipulation of districts for partisan or 
factual advantage--comprised in its various 
54House Elections Committee, SJl, Exhibit 6 (Salem, 
Or.: April 14, 1965). 
forms, the heart of the ~olitical thicket tGat 
the judiciary skirted most gingerly. Moreover, 
the Supreme Court had paradoxically encouraged 
the potential ~or widespread gerrymandering, 
while gradually developing a single-minded 
quest for mathematical equality. In 
particular two decisions in the spring of 
1969 laid t:1e groundwor£ (no doubt, uninten-
tionally) for proliferating the more advanced 
and subtle forms of discriminatory cartography. 
Inevitable legal challenges will pose a 
dilemma for the courts: whether to allow the 
ideal of representative equality to be under-
mined by pervasive gerrymanders, or whether 
to elaborate the stand~~d beyond mere 
mathematical equality.?? 
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Mr. Baker has accepted the 'one-man, one-vote' principle 
as applied in Baker, but he has failed to grasp its full 
significance. The Supreme Court unconsciously encouraged 
widespread gerrymandering; however, the groundwork was 
laid in 1962 with Baker vs Carr. In so doing the court 
developed a new majoritarian philosophy. Representation 
was conceived on the equality-population basis. Witn the 
court's premise, gerr)"I!landering could not exist. It was 
and is a term creating inequality by the very fact that it 
admits to some type of special interest, whether it be 
partisan ties, geographic boundaries, or the like. The 
problem, therefore, is the reconcilability of ~nese two 
concepts. To propose an elaboration of "the standard beyond 
mere mathematical equality 11 56 is to suggest that the court 
nullify its adamant stand on 'one-man, one-vote' and turn 
55N. w. Folsby, ed., Rea ortionment in tr!e 1970's 
(Ber~eley: University of California Press, 971 , pp. 121-122. 
5bibid., p. 122. 
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bac% to apportionment standards of pre-Baker times. 
The Burger Court in its Mahan vs Prichard decision took a 
definite step in this direction. The case involved 
Virginia's House redistricting statute which was challenged 
on the basis that there were impermissible population vari-
ances in the districts, that the multimember districts 
diluted representation, and that the use of the multi-
member districts constituted. racial gerrymandering. 11 57 
The court ignored the racial gerrymandering issue, but by 
its punctuated affirmance of "the State's rational objective 
of preserving the integrity of political subdivision lines 11 58 
and by its allowance for greater percentage flexibility 
in population variances among districts, it backed away from 
Baker vs Carr and Reynolds vs Sims and walked right into 
the concept underlying the gerrymander, e.g. the preservation 
of district lines because of politics, history, natural 
boundaries, or other special features. 
Another consequence of the Warren Court's majoritarian 
philosophy and reasoning is that Baker vs Carr and more 
especially Revnolds vs Sims with its adjoining decision 
Lucas vs Forty-Forth General Assembly of Colorado have 
reflected a change in the fundamental ideological concept 
of the division of power as manifested in the balancing 
57Mahan vs Prichard, ill LW u277. 
5Sibid. 
.. . -~· 
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version of the separation of powers. The Federal Constitution 
derived its balancing version of the separation of powers 
from adopted state constitutions, most particularly that 
of Massachusetts which had been chiefly framed by John Adams 
in 1 (8 O. 
The doctrine of the separation of powers had grown 
through several centuries of English and French history 
and its adoption in framing governments had been urged 
for one or several reasons as noted by W. B. Gwyn in his 
monograph The Meaning of the Separation of Powers. They 
were for efficiency in government, for fairness to the 
common good in legislating laws, for assurance that admini-
stration of the laws was impartially given and that admini-
strators were subject to them also, for allowance that 
representatives of the people might be able to ma~e executive 
officers accountable for abuses of their power, and finally 
for the establishment of 'a balance of governmental powers. 11 59 
It was John Adams who laid much of the initial groundwork 
for the acceptance in American political circles of the 
balancing version of the separation of powers. He introduced 
the threefold concept of governmental branches and their 
functions. The judiciary was his important inclusion. 
In his writings of 1776, Adams was solicitious about the 
weakness of the judiciary. It was his belief and ~ear that 
59w. B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers 
(New Orleans: Tulane University 1965), p. 127-128 • 
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the judiciary would not survive a struggle between the 
executive and a de~ocratic unicameral legislature; a legis-
lature of such composition "would undermine the courts. 1160 
The solution seemed to be t~e adoption of: 
A mixed constitution with an aristocratic 
chamber in the legislature to hold the balance 
between the monarchic executive and the demo-
cratic legislative ch8J!lber. Adams thus proposed 
two overlapping sets of checks and balances; 
the three branches of th~ government and the 
monarchic, aristocratic, aud democratic parts 
of the legislative branch.bl 
John Adams had endeavored to incorporate these ideas into 
constitutions of the South, such as Virginia, as well as 
many other states. But Virginia's political leaders and 
the leaders of some other states regarded his ideas with 
disdain. They succeeded in drafting constitutions highly 
majoritarian in philosophy and content. This was manifest 
in their provisions for popularly elected legislatures. 
From Adams' writing and the Massachusetts Constitution, 
wherein the Senate and the House were distinguished in 
apportioning the former by taxes and the latter by people, 
to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, a shift in empr.asis 
beca~e apparent. Adams' basic structural formulation, which 
was one of the features giving the Massachusetts Constitution 
such great longevity, was to be the cornerstone of American 
6ow. B. 
(New Orleans: 
61Ibid. 
Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers 
Tulane University 1965), p. 117 
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constitutionalism. The concern became centered upon 
legislative imbalance as a result of inadequate state 
constitutional provisions and the rising tide of popular 
despotism exemplified by Shay's Rebellion. Probably the 
most vocal and the most acutely aware of their constitution's 
defects were Virginians such as Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison. They and many others had seen with the 
passage of time and the rapid occurence of changing events, 
the importance of the balancing version of the separation 
of powers, the need for its further development, and the 
utmost urgency of its acceptance. Popular despotism was 
an ugly reality during the post-revolutionary war and 
pre-convention years. Its threat was vividly portrayed in 
Gordon Wood's book, The Creation of the .American Republic. 
Through observations of men made during this era, Wood 
captured the fears this ominous head created: 
"Wherever the real power in a Government lies," 
Madison told Jefferson, "there is the danger 
of oppression. In our Governments the real 
power lies in the majority of the Community, 
and the invasion of private rights is chiefly 
apprehended, not from acts of Government 
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but 
from acts in which the Government is the mere 
instrument of the major number of the 
constituents." The people, it seemed, were 
as capable of despotism as any prince; public 
liberty was no guarantee after all of private 
iiberty. At the be~inning of the Revolution, 
wrote Madison, Americans obvieusly had not per-
ceived this danger to the private rights of property 
from public liberty. "In all the Governments 
which were considered as beacons to republican 
patriots and law givers, the rights of persons 
were subjected to those of property"; through-
out history the poor had always been sacrificed 
to the rich. In 1776 Americans had assumed that 
their society was unique--so egalitarian that 
both rights coincided, so different that "a 
provision for the rights of person was supposed 
to include of itself those of property." And 
Americans naturally inferred, said Madison, 
"from the tendency of republican laws"--like 
the abolition of primogeniture and entail--
11that these different interests would be more 
and more identified." But alas! "experience 
and investigation° had eventually taught Madison 
that America was not different from other 
societies, that equality of condition was a 
chimera. Only a minority, said Madison, "can 
be interested in preserving the rights of 
property." Yet what could be done? In 1786 
a New Jersey critic of this majoritarian tyranny 
had argued that there were occasions when the 
legislature must ignore the voice of its 
constituents. "A virtuous legislature will not, 
cannot listen to any proposition, however popular, 
that came within the description of being 
UNJUST, impolitic, and unnecessary." 'tr'hen we 
are not a republican government," was the 
formidable reply, 11 for the evident significance 
thereof is that the people (the majority of the 
people) bear rule, and it is for them to determine 
wether a proposition6is UNJUST, IMPOLITIC, and UNNECESSARY or not. 0 2 
The remedy for this threat which the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention sought, was solidly rooted in 
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John Adams' balancing version of the separation of powers. 
Although the mode with regard to the legislature differed 
from Adams' application of it in the Massachusetts Con::>titution 
of 1780 because of the consideration of the union of several 
states, nevertheless, the principle remained deep and abiding. 
62Gordon s. Wood, 
1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: 
1969), pp. 410-411. 
The Creation of the American Republic, 
University of North Carolina Press, 
. • 
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Nearly two hundred years later, Chief Justice Earl 
Warren in Reynolds vs Sims implied modern ac.mowledgment of 
the existence of the balancing version of the separation 
of powers and its vitality when he attempted to reassure 
all that although both houses of the legislature would be 
based on population, t~ere were possibilities enabling each 
body to be differently composed. However, he did not probe 
into its historic purposes, but rather he noted the most 
obvious reason for bicameralism as the insurance of 
"mature and deliberate consideration of, and to prevent 
precipitate action on proposed legislative measures. 1163 
Warren assured that difference in numbers between houses, 
difference in district sizes from which each body could be 
elected, difference in the length of terms for senators and 
representatives, and difference in single and multi-member 
districts could be used by the states to achieve the objective 
of engendering "differing complexions and collective attitudes 
in the two bodies of a state legislature. 1164 During pre-
constitutional times and thereafter most of these methods 
had been used by one state or another in varying forms. In 
spite of this fact, Adar.is chose to build a much firmer founda-
tion by having the legislative branches apportioned differently; 
an idea readily adopted by New Hampshire in their 1784 
63Reynolds vs Sims 84 S.Ct. 1387. 
64Ibid • 
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Constitution. Interestingly enough Warren's decision 
in effect declared ~ew HaMpshire's 1784 constitutional 
provision for apportionment unconstitutional. Until 
November, 1964, New Hampshire had retained the 1784 appor-
tionment section. This contrast gives emphasis to the 
difference from interpreting and applying the balancing 
version of the separation of powers in the 1780's and in 
the 1960's. 
CHAPTER IV 
STANDING 
The court, having established its jurisdiction on 
this foundation of logic, proceeded to the issue of 'standing'. 
This was the determination of whether there was a position 
in the Baxer vs Carr case from which legal rights and 
duties might be asserted or enforced. Among the three 
arguments it was the shortest and the most unnoticed. That 
it is the least-mentioned issue of the decision would seem 
to indicate an oversight as to its significance. If so, 
this is unfair since it contains matters pivotal to the 
entire case. Justice Brennan made a statement for the 
majority wherein past judicial action with regard to voting 
was summarized. In it are elements suggestive of the need 
for a judicious pause: 
A citizen's right to vote free of arbitrary 
impairment by state action has been judicially 
recognized as a right secured by the Constitution, 
when such impairment resulted from dilution by 
false tally, cf. United States vs. Classic ••• , or 
by a refusal to count votes from arbitrarily 
selected precincts, cf. United States vs. Mosley ••• , 
or by a stg~fing of the ballot box, cf. Ex parte 
Siebold ••• 
65Baker VS Carr, 82 s.ct. 705. 
h6 
Behind his remark lies the asswnption that the 1901 Tennessee 
statute, in which the Jeneral Assembly passed the Appor-
tionment Act abandoning separate en~~eration required by 
an 1870 statute "in favor of reliance upon the Federal 
Census, 1166 fell within the same juristical rule or 
standard as United States vs Classic, United States vs 
Mosley, and Ex parte Siebold. To facilitate an understanding af 
the validity of this assumption, it is necessary to examine 
the facts of these cases pertinent to Baker and to review 
the history and circumstances fran which these cases evolved. 
Among the Radical Reconstruction measures of 1870 and 
1871 were the Enforcement Act of 1870 and its supplementary 
amendment, the Enforcement Act of February, 1871. The 
provisions of these acts had their genesis in the extension 
of Negro suffrage and the subsequent exploits of the Ku Klux 
Klan and other similar organizations to whose activities 
much of the South had become an arena. The principle target 
of the organizations' activities were Negroes, toward them 
the South's fears of political and racial supremacy were 
directed. Intimidation ranged from burning crops and hoMes 
to physical mutilation and murder. So rampant were these 
atrocities, that growing public demand forced Congress and 
the President to act. This humanitarian concern coupled 
with political motives prompted Congress to adopt the 
Enforcement Act of 1870, or as Alan Trelease noted: 
66 Baker vs Carr, 82 S.Ct. 705. 
When Congress was finally moved to action in 
1870, it was thinking of the coming fall elections 
as much as tLe personal plight of Southern 
Republicans. The Fifteenth .Amendment had just 
confirmed and extended Negro suffrage and empowered 
Congress to enforce it by appropriate legis-
lation. The Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, 
was concerned primarily wit~ the bribery or 
intimidation of voters, which it made a federal 
offense, punishable in federal courts. But 
section 6 made it a felony for two or more 
persons to deprive someone of any right or 
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privilege of citizenship, or to punish him afterward 
for having exercised it •. And if anyone, in 
violating these provisions, committed any other 
crime he was subject to the same penalties 
provided for that offense by the state in which 
it was committed. The President, finally, was 
empowered to use the armed forg7s of the United 
States to apprehend violators. 
Sadly enough, the victims of these atrocities rarely received 
redress, and the Supreme Court in 1876 virtually "emasculated 
the Enforcement Acts by ruling"68 in United States vs Reese 
and United States vs Cruikshank '~hat the federal government 
could protect civil rights only against their abridgment 
by states, not individuals."69 
Yet the Supreme Court upheld fraudulent state inter-
ference in elections as a penal offense punishable under 
federal law. Ex parte Siebold in 1879 was a strong affirma-
tion by the court en this point. The defendant, Judge 
Siebold of Maryland, had engaged in ''stuffing the ballot box"70 
67Alan Trelease, White Terror (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1971), p. 385. 
68~., p. 418. 
69Ibid. 
70Ex parte Siebold 100 U.S. 379. 
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to distort election results. Justice Joseph Bradley delivered 
the majority opinion asserting that Judge Siebold was a 
state officer and that fraudulent actions such as "stuffing 
the ballot box1171 were explicit criminal offenses by state 
officials for which relief could be sought. It was under 
federal jurisdiction. United States vs Mosley in 1914 involved 
a litigation against two state election officers of 
Oklahoma. The main charge was conspiracy "to injure and 
oppress certain qualified electors 1172 from exercising 
their right to vote. The end result of their actions was the 
omission of certain individuals' ballots from the count. 
From this conspiracy other charges arose, but it was in reference 
to the act of omission that Justice Oliver Holmes applied 
the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871 and declared such an 
act a criminal offense. Likewise, it was within this 
context that the often-quoted sentence came into being: 
"We regard it as equally unquestionable that the right to 
have one's vote counted is as open to protection by Congress 
as the right to put a ballot in a box. 117 3 In United States 
vs Mosley the principles set down in Ex parte Siebold were 
reaffirmed. The remaining case cited by Justice Brennan in 
Baker was the United States vs Classic decision of 1940. 
71Ex parte Siebold 100 U. S. 379. 
72united States vs Mosley, 238 u. S. 3e5. 
73Ibid. p. 386. 
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The election laws were extended to include primary elections. 
As a consequence the conspiracy and actual "alteration of 
the ballots~ 7h cast and the "false certification of the 
number of votes cast for the respective candidates"75 
by the Commissioners of Elections in Louisiana was criminal 
under federal statute and therefore within federal 
jurisdiction. 
All three of these cases demonstrate a relatively nar-
row interpretation of the Revised Statutes relating to those 
sections drawn from the EnforceMent Acts of May, 1870 and 
February, 1871, and voting rights to be protected. Each one 
contains specific criminal offenses. But in the assertion 
of such jurisdiction, particularly the post-Reconstruction 
decision Ex parte Siebold, federal over state authority is 
of prime importance. It was on this foundation that Justice 
Brennan based his assumption that these cases were within 
the same juristical rule or standard as Ba~er vs Carr. 
However, he failed to distinguish the judicial questions in 
Baker from those he cited. The failure is judicially repre-
hensible, for the meaning of these decisions and phrases 
concerning criminal election offenses has been placed in a 
purely political context. When a juristical standard has been 
broadened to such a degree, is there not a need for clarifica-
tion and more careI'ul consideration and attention? 
7hunited States vs Classic, 313 U. s. 309. 
?5Ibid. 
CHAPTER V 
JUSTICIABILITY 
Probably the most controversial section of Baker vs 
Carr was the one devoted to the justiciability argument. 
It contained many references to the judicial doctrine of 
'political questions' that Chief Justice John Marshall 
introduced into U.S. Constitutional law and that was further 
expanded and elaborated upon by later justices. Invoking 
this doctrine enabled the court to avoid a confrontation 
it felt obliged to avoid because of the nature of the issue 
or the circumstances from which it arose. The volatileness 
of the legal problem might stem from various sources. Two 
of the most obvious would be if it was a national issue of 
extreme emotional import to which the court might go counter, 
or more likely it might be an infringement upon the powers 
exercised by the executive or legislative branches of the 
government. One of the court's milestones in the development 
of the 'political questions' doctrine was the 1849 Supreme 
Court case Luther vs Borden with the majority opinion written 
-by Chief Justice Roger Brook Taney. So frequently does 
Justice Brennan mention and allude to it, that to appropriately 
examine the justiciability argument of Baker would be accom-
plished best by first delving into Luther vs Borden. 
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It was from the Rhode Island setting of the Dorr 
War in the early 1840's that the court's final pronouncement 
of Luther vs Borden, February, 1849 came. Before going 
into specific argW'lents and opinions, a recapitulation of 
events leading to the Dorr War is essential. 
Due to substantial industrial expansion during the 1830 1 s, 
Rhode Island experienced a transformation in its economic, 
social, and political structure. The development of steam 
power, the creation of new industries, and the renovation 
of older industries through newly-applied technical inventions 
were arnong the immediate causes giving impetus to Rhode 
Island's shift from a primarily maritime economy to an indus-
trial one. Inherent to this change was the relocation of 
people, capital, and to a certain extent, industry itself. 
New centers of growth spotted the rivers and coastal region 
where steam power was accessible. Urban areas, particularly 
Providence, eagerly sought to take advantage of the conditions 
and becarne the hub of commercial endeavor; whereas, other areas, 
such as Newport, lagged behind and even diminished in size, 
either because they lacked t~e aggressive initiative of 
their more northern competitor or because the geography of 
the region was ill-suited to industrial development. 
In addition to the harnessing of steam power and tne ever-
present concern of Rhode Island entrepreneurs to seek economic 
diversification, the beginning waves of French Canadian and 
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Irish Catholic immigrants were ~aking themselves felt, par-
ticularly in industrial centers. The combination of 
industrial expansion and an immigrant labor force created a 
sharp delineation in the character of the urban-rural commun-
ities. The urban community reflected an increasingly large 
number of landless Catholic workers contrasted with the 
predominately land-owning Protestant rural community whose 
numbers were comparatively few and in many instances decreasing. 
These economic and social changes brought with them a 
pressing need for political reform both within the context 
of extended suffrage and the equalization of representation. 
The former was obviously evident, since Rhode Island still 
retained its suffrage provision that a man must have $134 
worth of real property to be eligible to vote. This qualifi-
cation coupled with the circumstances, previously mentioned, 
of the swelling numbers of landless people in the cities made 
such a provision an anachronism. The latter need for political 
reform was equally, if not more, apparent.76 
Further compounding the complexity of the political 
situation in Rhode Island was the desire of many electors to 
have a bill of rights. Rhode Island was unique among the 
colonies in that it continued under the Charter granted to it 
by Charles II. After the Revolutionary War, most of the 
76Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage from Property 
to Democrac~ 1760-1860 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1960 , p. 246. 
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colonies adopted their own constitutions and bill of rights 
from which much of the Federal Constitution was patterned. 
Several times during Rhode Island's history, the General 
Assembly attempted to do li~ewise, but the British Occupation 
of 1777 thwarted one attempt and a later effort in the 1820 1 s 
was shelved by the Assembly and eventually defeated. 
(This last effort began as an exercise in political pacifica-
tion rather than a sincere gesture to change the existing 
government.) 
Although Rhode Island continued under a charter govern-
ment, the colony, later the state, actively participated both 
in the writing and signing of the Declaration of Independence 
and in the discussions and decisions of the Constitutional 
Convention. As a state, the charter government sent senators· 
and representatives to Congress, but this was dimmed in the 
1830 1 s by gross inadequacies found in limited suffrage, 
malapportionment, and the absence of a bill of rights. It 
was within this political climate that Thomas Dorr and his 
followers gained prominence. 
Thomas Dorr was the son of a Rhode Island merchant, who 
had extensive experience in trading with China. Being from 
the merchant class meant being among the socially elite 
distinction by early nineteenth century standards in Rhode 
Island. His education rerlected this, ror among the schools 
he attended were Exeter and Harvard. From European travel 
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and study, Dorr became ardently imbued with Jeffersonian 
ideals, and upon his return to the United States, he applied 
himself to the study of law. Several years were spent in the 
practice of law until Thomas Dorr became a politician and 
was elected a legislator to the General Assembly. Hereupon, 
Dorr involved himself in efforts to secure suffrage, 
representation, and judicial reform. At the outset his 
provisions for reform were moderate, for he only wished 
to extend suffrage "to middle-class taxpayers and, perhaps, 
militiamen."77 But these proposals were turned down by the 
legislature, and the nucleus of Dorr supporters fell into 
oblivion only to be followed by a more radical group. It 
was this group that took affirmative action to correct 
political abuses by calling a constitutional convention and 
adopting and ratifying a constitution, which had among some 
of its provisions the extension of suffrage to all white, 
twenty-one year old males. The People's Constitution won a 
majority of votes from the Rhode Island electorate which 
:lncluded the Constitution's newly-enfranchised voters. After 
its acceptance the Dorrites submitted their constitution to 
the Governor and the General Assembly of the Charter Go\'ernment, 
whereupon it was soundly rejected and in its place, the 
Algerine Law was passed prohibiting anyone from taking part 
77Peter J. Coleman, The Transformation of Rhode Island 
(Providence: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 259. 
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in the Dorrite move~ent under the threat of punishment 
for misdemeanor, high crime, or treason. Defying the 
Charter Governrnent's action, the Dorrites held elections 
for the selection of officers and chose Thomas Dorr as 
governor. They declared this to be the legitimate govern-
ment and Dorr sent himself on an unsuccessful mission to 
obtain President Tyler's support and approval. Returning 
to Rhode Island, Dorr and his followers attempted to seize 
a small arsenal at Providence, but their efforts were thwarted 
by a forewarning given to the tiny garrison and by the damp 
atmosphere which prevented the Dorrite cannon from firing. 
As Peter Coleman recalled in his book The Transformation of 
Rhode Island, dense fog also covered the area and as it lifted, 
Dorr found he had been virtually abandoned by his followers 
who had crept away unseen. With the choice of arrest or 
flight, he fled Rhode Island leaving it within the Charter 
Government's temporary pale of martial law. This abortive 
attempt and the events associated with it are commonly 
referred to as the Dorr War. After the incident of the 
Providence arsenal and an earlier June seizure effort at 
Chetapatchet, the Charter Go·iernment in May, 1843 adopted 
and ratified a new constitution based largely upon the 
originally moderate Dorr proposals. With its acceptance 
by the majority oI' Rhode Island voters, the old Charter 
Government relinquished its powers to the new. 
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From this Rhode Island controversy and insurrection, 
the Luther vs Borden case arose. Martin Luther, the plain-
tiff, was known to have been an active Dorrite. Luther 
Borden, the defendant, was a Charter Government militia man 
who had bro:{en into Luther's house attempting to secure 
Martin Luther's person for arrest under the existing law which 
prohibited involvment in the Dorr movement. Martin Luther's 
contention was that Borden had unlawfully entered his house, 
since the Dorr Government was the legitimate government 
at the time and thus the law under which Borden acted was 
null and void. 
Delivering the majority opinion Chief Justice Taney 
addressed himself to the practicalities of the court's 
establishing the Dorr Government's legitimacy. The initial 
question necessarily involved the actual existence of such a 
government, or as Taney stated: 
We do not understand from the argumEl'lt that the 
constitution under which the plaintiff acted is 
supposed to have been in force after the consti-
tution of May, 1843, went into operation. The 
contest is confined to the year preceding. The 
plaintiff contends that the charter government 
was displaced, and ceased to have any lawful 
power, after the organization, in May, 1842 
of the Government which he supported, and 
although that government never was able to 
exercise any authority in the State, nor to 
command obedience to its laws or to its 
officers, yet he insists that it was the law-
ful and established government, upon the ground 
that it was ratified-by a large majority of the 
male people of the State of the age of twenty-one 
and upwards, and also by a majority of t~ose who 
were entitled to vote for general officers 78 under the then existing laws of the State. 
A few paragraphs later he noted the immediate problems 
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underlying a court decision recognizing the Dorr Government 
as the truly existing government during this time and agree-
ing that the charter government had been annulled by such 
action: 
••• then the laws passed by the Legislature 
during that time were nullities; its taxes 
wrongfully collected; its salaries and 
compensations to its officers illegally paid; 
its public accounts improperly settled; and 
the judgments and sentences of its courts in 
civil and criminal cases null and void, and 
the officers who carried their decisions into 
operation answerable as trespassers, if not 
in some cases criminals.79 
But aside from these noticeable effects, Taney recognized 
far more serious implications arising from the arguments 
presented by the attorneys for the plaintiff. It was this 
nucleus around which several interpretations of the 
Guarantee Clause of the U. s. Constitution revolved. The 
potential impact of these interpretations should begin with 
a restatement of the Clause: 
The United States shall guarantee to every 
State in this Union a republican form of 
government, and shall protect each of them 
against invasion; and an application of the 
legislature, or the executive (when the legis-
lature cag8ot be convened) against domestic 
violence.J 
7e 
' Luther vs Borden, 7 Howard 597. 
79 roid. 
80u. s., Constitution, art. IV, sec. 4. 
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The thesis underlying t~e pro-Dorr appeal given by 
Mr. Benjamin Hallett was: 
••• that government is instituted by the people, 
and for the benefit, protection, and security of 
the people, nation, or community. And that 
when any government shall be found inadequate 
or contrary to these purposes, a majority of 
the cormnunity hath an indubitable, inalienable, 
and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or 
abolish the same, in such manner as shall, be 
judged most conducive to the public wea1.51 
The Hallett argument was profuse with statements reflecting 
these principles in one way or another. Little mention 
was given the Guarantee Clause. Only in an advancement 
of a "proposition as to the theory of American government, 1182 
which was a reiteration primarily of the peoples• sovereignty 
and their right to adopt a form of government, was the 
phrase tac,:ed on "subject only to a limitation provided 
by the United States Constitution, that the State governments 
shall be republican. 118 3 It was towards the end of the 
concluding argument that any substantial discussion of the 
Clause was made, and this fell within the confines of 
just interpreting the portion relating to "domestic violence. 1184 
Concentration on these principles to the near exclusion 
of the Guarantee Clause more than likely benefitted the purposes 
of legal disputation. But the polemical forces of debate by 
81Luther vs Borden, 7 Howard 589. 
82.1l2.i£., P. 5go. 
83Ibid. 
84u. s. Constitution, art. IV, sec. 4. 
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omission, placement, and accentuation yield a subtle, yet 
new, connotation to the Guarantee Clause best described 
as libertarian. The people's sovereignty ana their right 
to form a government are elevated above the plane of the 
Guarantee Clause, since it is "subject only"B5 to the 
Clause's provisions. The result of these subtle intricacies 
is the creation of a concept of the Claus~ positive and 
activist in meaning. Limitation with its negative con-
notation of restriction upon the principles of sovereignty and 
choice changes to a more positive one of qualification, the 
minimum qualification of certification requirement being 
republican in form. 
Responding to these pleadings were John Whipple and 
Daniel Webster, attorneys for the defendant or, more 
specifically, the Charter Government. Among the many rebuttals, 
Webster's description of the Guarantee Clause and its 
purpose is notable: 
There must be an authentic mode of ascertaining 
the public will somehow and somewhere. If not, it 
is a government of the strongest and most numerous ••• 
What do the Constitution and Laws of the United 
States say upon this point? The Constitution re-
cognizes the existence of States, and guarantees to 
each a republican form of government, and to protect 
them against domestic violence. The thing w~ich is 
to be protected is the existing State government. 
This is clear by referring to the Act of Congress 
of 1795. In case of insurrection against a State, 
or the government thereof, the Pre3ident is to 
interrere. The Constitution proceeds upon the 
idea that each State will ta~e care to establish 
its government upon proper principles, and does 
851uther vs Borden, 7 ~oNard 590. 
not contenplate these extraneous and_irregular 
alterations of existing governr.:ents.d6 
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Furthermore, the right to peaceable revolution was repudiated. 
The basic pre~ise Webster defined was that the Guarantee 
Clause was designed to protect governments in existence. 
To buttress his argument Webster referred to Congress' 
Enforcement Act of 1795. The Militia Act of 1792 had expired 
and as William Wiecek points out: 
Congress, unwilling to dispense with such a useful 
statute, re-enacted its substance with some 
important changes as the Enforcement Act of 1795 
••• The Enforcement Act of 1795 was supplemented 
by an 1807 statute authorizing the President to 
use regular army forces as well as the federalized 
militia for law enforcement purposes. The acts 
of 1795 and 1807 remain in the United States Code 
today, virtually unaltered from their original 
form, as the basic author~tY for federal control 
of state military forces. 
These considerations were important for two reasons. First, 
Webster used the Congressional Act as supportive evidence 
to advance his main premise that the Guarantee Clause was 
insurance to keep existing governments intact or, more precisely, 
the Guarantee Clause and the obligation to protect were one. 
Status quo best describes an interpretation of this nature. 
Second, Chief Justice Taney took what Webster intended as a 
supportive feature and provided an entirely different render-
ing of the Guarantee Clause. 
86Luther vs Borden, 7 Howard 590. 
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Addressing himself to the implications in the pleadings 
before him, Chief Justice Taney discussed the court's 
inability, as a judicial body, to determine the qualifica-
tions of voters: 
It is the province of a court to expound the 
law not make it. And certainly it is no 
part of the judicial functions of any court 
of the United States to prescribe the qualifica-
tions of voters in a State, giving the right to 
those to whom it is denied by the written and 
established constitution and laws of the state, 
or taking it away from those to whom it is given; 
nor has it the right to determine what political 
privileges the citizens of a State are entitled 
to, unless there is an establi~bed constitution 
or law to govern its decision.be 
He recognized the difficulties involved if the court were 
to take upon itself the task of determining whether a majority 
of the voters had or had not approved such a constitution. 
It would have required the testimony of witnesses, verifica-
tion 01· all voters' qualifications, and lastly a question 
of how long the people of Rhode Island would have to wait to 
find out what government they were living under. 
Paramount to these very real problems were several 
serious questions. The first one Chief Justice Taney gave 
cognizance to when he noted that this decision would have to 
be made by a jury, since the case was a question of fact. 
It would then depend upon the jury's judgment to ascertain 
the people of Rhode Island's form of government. T.~e dangers 
88Luther vs Borden, 7 Howard 598. 
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arising from this aspect of the case were quic~ly perceived 
by Taney who stated: 
And as a verdict is not evidence in suit between 
different parties, if the courts of the United 
States have the jurisdiction contended for by the 
plaintiff, the question whether acts done under 
the charter government during the period of con-
test are valid or nor Must always remain unsettled 
and open to dispute. The authority and security of 
the State go~9rnments do not rest upon such unstable 
foundations. · 
The second serious question was not directly approached by 
the Chief Justice; rather it was implied in his ready affirma-
tion that cases pertaining to the Guarantee Clause: 
••• rests with Congress to decide what government 
is the establishaione in a ~tate. For as the 
United States guarantee to each State a republi-
can government, Congress must necessarily decide 
what government is establishaiin the State before 
it can determine whether it is republican or 
not. And when the senators and representatives of a 
a State are appointed, as well as its republican 
character, is recognized by the proper 
constitutional authority. And its decision is 
binding on every other department of the govern-
ment, and95ould not be questioned in a judicial tribunal. 
Furthermore, Taney used Webster's supportive argument involving 
tne 1795 Enforcement Act to substantiate his position of 
congressional and executive jurisdiction with respect to the 
Guarantee Clause. Proceeding to the domestic violence 
provision of t~e Clause and considering the 1795 Enforcement 
Act alongside it enabled the Chief Justice to reinforce his 
previous argument with finality. Taney remarked: 
89Luther vs Bordon, 7 Howard 599. 
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So, too as relates to the clause in the 
above mentioned article of the Constitution 
providing for cases of domestic violence. ' 
It rested wi t"'.1 Congress, too, to de terrnine 
upon the means proper to be adopted to ful-
fill this guarantee. They might, if they 
had deemed it most advisable to do so, 
have placed it in the power of the court to 
decide when a contingency had happened which 
required the federal government to interfere. 
But Congress thought otherwise, and no 
doubt wisely; and by the Act of February 28, 
1795, provided, that, "in case of an insur-
rection in any State against the government 
thereof it shall be lawful for the President 
of the United States, on application of the 
legislature of such state or of the executive 
(when the Legislature cannot be convened), 
to call forth such number of the militia 
of any other State or States, as may be applied 
for, as he may judge sufficient to supress 
such insurrection." 
By this act, the power of deciding whether 
the exigency had arisen upon which the 
government of the United States is bound to 
interfere, is given to the President. He is 
to act upon the application of the legislature 
or of the executive, and consequently he must 
determine what body of men constitute the 
Legislature, ~£d who is the governor, before 
he can act ••• 
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To one constitutional historian, Williarri Wiecek, Chief Justice 
Taney's interpretation of the Guarantee Clause added to the 
already "repressive reading that Hamilton had given it in the 
Federalist. 1192 Hamilton had viewed the Clause as an instru-
mental device for the Union to assert its authority in 
"repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten 
9lLuther vs Borden, 7 Howard 599. 
92william M. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U. s. 
Constitution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 110. 
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the existence of the State constitutions ••• 11 93 It was a 
safeguard for the preservation of order by the Union. 
So concerned was Wiecek about this point and the historical 
irony to later be witnessed during Reconstruction that he 
very casually passed over the heart of Taney's apprehensions. 
Taney's construction of the guarantee clause 
was absolutistic, and therein lay its great 
vice. Hallett's and Webster's arguments left 
him no latitude to maneuver. Hallett insisted 
that the Court adopt the.theory of republican 
government that was then sharply debated in 
political forums and that, if adopted, would have 
made the Court the arbiter among fundamental 
political theories. Webster took advantage of 
this tactical indiscretion to urge total judicial 
abstention. Neither course was compelling, but 
Webster's appeared to be the less of two eYils, 
and Taney too~: it, apparently without considering 
its implications for the future.94 
Judging the Chief Justice's interpretation as 11 absolutistic" 
and pronouncing that "therein lay its vice 1195 is questionable. 
Unless the grounds for Taney's fears are more fully recog-
nized, neithr his position nor its future importance can be 
appreciated. 
If the court had permitted itself jurisdiction over a 
decision of the State or Congress and the Executive relating 
to the legitimacy of a form of government, Taney knew it woulo 
93Hamilton, Madison, Jay, 
Hamilton (New York and Toronto: 
p. 139. 
The Federalist Paoers No. 21: 
The New American Library, 1961) 
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Constitution (Ithaca: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1972), p. 12L. 
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not simply be a question of arbitrating "among fundamental 
political theories, 1196 but rather it would be a question 
of opening the door for the court to supplant those 
principles Hallett argued so eloquently for--the sovereignty 
of the people and the right to adopt a form of government. 
The fundamental implication was explicitly described by 
Taney's dissenting colleague, Justice Woodbury: 
And if the people, in the distribution of powers 
under the Constitution, should ever think of 
making supreme arbiters in political controver-
sies, when not selected by nor, frequently amenable 
to them, nor at liberty to follow such various 
considerations in their judgments as belong to 
mere political questions, they will dethrone 
themselves and lose one of their own invaluable 
birthrights; building up in this way--slowly, 
but surely--a new sovereign power in the 
republic, in most respects irresponsible and 
unchangeable for life, and one more dangerous, 
in theory at least, than the91orst elective oligarcy in the worst times. 
It is true Chief Justice Taney was not aware of the impli-
cations this case would have upon the future of the South. 
Yet with his adherence to federalism, Taney's interpretation 
of the Guarantee Clause, unlike Webster's status quo con-
struction preserved not just existing government but the 
sovereignty of the people and the other rights Hallett 
so convincingly asserted. 
Likewise if Luther vs Borden or sections of it are to 
be viewed as Taney nationalism, it must be done with utmost 
96'...Jilliam M. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the U. S. 
Constitution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 12u. 
97Luther vs Borden, 7 Howard 603. 
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caution. Tne legislature could be viewed as a political 
arena witn its checks and balances, theoretically, more 
difficult to control by one faction or another because of 
its representative and elective nature. With the limited 
alternatives available, Taney might have considered it much 
safer to turn to these two national branches of government, 
the legislature and the executive, giving heavy emphasis to 
the former than accept a branch, the judicial, which might 
prove more susceptible to one dominant control within the 
body. The potential threat of one national branch of the 
government was to be balanced by the two other national 
branches. Among this balance states' rights could best be 
protected. If this was one of Taney's underlying motives 
in his decision, thmLuther vs Borden under the aegis of 
Reconstruction dealt an even more poignantly ironic blow to 
his fears than has been previously recognized. It was the 
legislature that brought Luther out of safekeeping and used 
it and the Guarantee Clause as a base for extending a great 
portion of its authority in reconstructing and readmitting 
the South's rebel states. 
But irrespective of this, Taney's main concern was the 
preservation of the sovereignty o~ the people, their right to 
adopt a form of governI11ent, and the guarantee of a republican 
governnent. By his pronouncement the Chief Justice separated 
tr~e tt:reads of the web Sallett's libertarian argurlent had 
woven and ultimately kept these fundamental doctrines distinct 
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and alive. It was for this purpose that Ro~er Brook 
'" 
Taney adopted a steadfast position on the political 
question doctrine. 
The relationship of Luther vs Borden to Baker vs 
Carr is best expressed in Justice Felix Frankfurter's dis-
senting opinion in Baker where he liberally rebuked the 
Majority saying: 
To find such a political conception legally 
enforceable in the broad and unspecific guarantee 
of equal protection is to rewrite the Constitution. 
See Luther v. Borden, supra. Certainly, "equal 
protection" is no more a secure foundation 
for judicial judgment of the permissibility of 
varying forms of representative government tha~ 
is "Republican Form." Indeed since "equal 
protection of the laws" can only mean an equality 
of persons standing in the same relation to what-
ever governmental action is challenged, the 
determination whether treatment is equal pre-
supposes a determination concerning the nature 
of the relationship. This with respect to appor-
tionment~ means an inquiry into the theoretic 
base of representation in an accountably repub-
lican state. For a court could not determine 
the equal-protection issue without first deter-
mining the Republican-Form issue, simply because 
what is reasonable for equal-protection purposes 
will depend upon what form of government, 
basically, is allowed. To divorce "equal pro-
tection" from "Republican Form" is to talk about 
half a question.90 
So incisive was his perception of the court's position that 
it haunted the justiciability argument with special fervor. 
Justice Brennan answered in lively judicial debate: 
Rather it is argued that apportionment cases, 
whatever the actual wording or the complaint, 
can involve no federal constitutional right 
98Baker vs Carr, 82 S.Ct. 755-756. 
except one resting on the guaranty of a repub-
lican form of government, and that complaints 
based on that clause have been held to present 
political questions which are nonjusticiable. 
We hold that the claim pleaded here neither 
rests upon nor implicates the Guaranty Clause 
and that its justiciability is therefore not 
foreclosed by our decisions of cases involving 
that clause: •• Appellants' claim that they are 
being denied equal protection is justiciable, 
and if "discrimination is sufficiently s~:own, 
the right to relief under the equal protection 
clause is not diminished by the fact that 
discrimination relates to political ~~ghts." 
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 u:s. 1, 11 ••• 
Soon after this response Justice Brennan proceeded 
to give an elaborate discussion of the 'political 
questions doctrine.' He attempted to define the doc-
trine as well as demonstrate its applicability in the 
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various important decisions containing it. Highlighting 
Brennan's reassessment of the doctrine was Luther vs Borden. 
Heavily emphasizing Chief Justice Taney's crescendo of sup-
porting arguments and the final declaration, Justice 
Brennan omitted the context of Taney's apprehensions which 
were the heart behind his reasoning and which were steeped 
with the 'political question doctrine' so quic%ly crystallized 
by Justice Woodbury. This omission resulted in the 
Majority's failure to give a true rendering of the political 
question doctrine' and the Guarantee Clause in the most 
crucial and relevant of the cases discussed. 
What Justice Brennan did was establish a political 
right and divorce it fro~ any consideration of government. 
99Ba~er vs Carr, 82 S.Ct. 755-756. 
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By implication the ~:ajoritJ accepted its parallel 
application of the equal protection clause in Bro~n vs the 
Board of Education and 3aker vs Carr. The result of this 
reasoning was the development of a new majoritarianism 
whereby representation was conceived on the equality-
population basis. With Brennan's foundation of logic, 
gerrymandering could not exist. Its consideration would 
only mean inequality, because it is a term which admits 
to some type of special interest. Also, acceptance of 
Baker vs Carr anj Reynolds vs Sims was an implied acknowl-
edgement of the modern interpretation of the balancing 
version of the separation of powers. 
It is something of a paradox that a Chief Justice who 
handed down Luther vs Borden, a decision extremely instru-
mental in preserving the constitutional characteristics 
of our Union, and Dred Scott vs Sanford, a gross perpet-
uation of civil injustice and a decision contributing to 
the outbreak of the Civil War, should find his historical 
opposite nearly a century later in Chief Justice Earl 
Warren who presided over Brown vs the Board of Education, 
one of many decisions his court rendered alleviating 
serious civil injustices, and Baker vs Carr, an attempt 
to solve the ~alapportionment problem of the states by 
injecting into constitutional law a new philosop~y of 
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majcritarianism. The latter was based upon questionable 
judicial logic and accompanied by a modern statement 
of a fundamental ideological principle of &~erican con-
s ti tu tionalism, the balancing version of the separation 
of powers. Perhaps it is here that Justice Fran~furter's 
objection should be posed. Should the court have entered 
the "political thicket"? The answer may be found in the 
effect the judicial reasoning of Baker vs Carr has had 
upon constitutional law and political thought and it may 
be found in the Oregon experience, wherein a state could 
and did resolve this controversial problem before u. s. 
Supreme Court action was taken. 
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